



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
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OPNAVINST 8120.2
DNS
15 Sep 2015

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 8120.2

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MONITORING AND REPORTING READINESS
TO EXECUTE THE NAVY NUCLEAR DETERRENCE MISSION

Ref: (a) SECNAVINST 8120.1B
(b) OPNAVINST 8120.1

Encl: (1) NNDM Components and Functional Areas
(2) NNDM Terms and Definitions
(3) Self-Assessment Process

1. Purpose. To implement the guidance in references (a) and (b) to assure comprehensive understanding of the current and projected integrated ability to execute the Navy's nuclear deterrence mission (NNDM) and to facilitate corrective or mitigating actions that address current or future shortfalls.

2. Applicability. This instruction is applicable to the Navy components of the NNDM listed in enclosure (1).

3. Background

a. Reference (a) delineates Department of the Navy policy and assigns overarching nuclear weapons (NW) responsibilities and authorities.

b. Per reference (b), Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP) is the NNDM's regulatory lead, responsible to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for monitoring and assessing all aspects of the mission. Assignment of DIRSSP as the NNDM regulatory authority does not replace or supersede any existing responsibility, authority, or accountability of NNDM component commanders for their assigned forces, including their responsibility for operational readiness reporting per applicable Navy and combatant command requirements.

c. The NNDM encompasses a broad range of activities (the NNDM functional areas) that work together as a system of systems (SoS) to support the Navy's overarching nuclear deterrence mission.

(1) The NNDM SoS encompasses activities that directly involve NW and NW systems, including the activities listed in subparagraphs 3c(1)(a) through 3c(1)(g).

- (a) NW security;
- (b) NW safety and accident and incident response;
- (c) integrated logistics support;
- (d) radiation health;
- (e) personnel reliability;
- (f) manpower, inspection, and certification; and
- (g) nuclear command, control, and communications and intelligence support.

(2) The NNDM functional areas describe the range of activities to be monitored by DIRSSP and echelon 2 NNDM component commanders in assessing NNDM readiness.

(3) Enclosure (1) identifies the applicability of each of the NNDM functional areas to each of the NNDM component commanders. Enclosure (2) provides definitions of the NNDM functional areas and additional NNDM terms and definitions.

4. Responsibilities. Reference (a) directs the CNO to assign specific NNDM responsibilities to CNO staff and echelon 2 Navy commands. Reference (b) assigns responsibilities and establishes supported and supporting relationships among Navy organizations with NNDM responsibilities.

a. The Director of Navy Staff (DNS) must ensure that the biennial Navy Nuclear Weapons Assessment (NNWA) required by reference (a) evaluates the adequacy of the end-to-end assessment processes established by this instruction.

b. DIRSSP is the echelon 2 supported flag officer for developing, coordinating, and implementing policies associated with assessing and reporting the personnel and material readiness of the NNDM SoS. DIRSSP must:

(1) Issue and maintain guidance for reporting by NNDM component commanders in support of NNDM end-to-end assessments. If any information required for the end-to-end assessment is not available in existing reporting, including reports required by this instruction, DIRSSP will coordinate with the relevant component commanders to specify the required inputs, and provide additional guidance as necessary to ensure the timely flow of information. DIRSSP will establish a process to maintain and update this guidance.

(2) Use NNDM component commanders' reports required by this instruction, and supplemented by various existing reporting systems, component commanders' metrics, and other information to independently develop end-to-end assessments of the Navy's current and projected ability to execute the NNDM. The end-to-end assessments will identify current and projected shortfalls as well as assess the effectiveness of corrective action reported by the responsible commands.

(3) Report to the CNO on the Navy's current and projected integrated ability to execute the NNDM; including the NNDM component commanders' estimates.

(4) Present NNDM findings requiring coordinated Navy action to the Navy's nuclear deterrence mission oversight Council (NNDMOC).

(5) Provide CNO periodic reports of end-to-end assessments and update him or her after significant changes occur.

(6) Provide feedback to the NNDM component commanders regarding end-to-end assessments, reporting, and corrective actions to facilitate iterative and enterprise-wide improvement.

(7) Coordinate and provide recommendations to DNS, as needed, regarding updates to this instruction.

(8) Serve as executive secretary in support of the biennial NNWA effort led by DNS. Propose NNWA schedule, membership, and focus areas to DNS for review and concurrence prior to biennial execution, and ensure that the NNWA will assess synchronization of NNDM reporting with actual performance.

c. The NNDM component commanders are the echelon 2 supporting flag officers responsible for keeping DIRSSP apprised of the current and projected future state of readiness of assigned elements to execute the NNDM using the guidance set forth by this instruction, supplemental guidance, and other directives as issued. The NNDM component commanders must:

(1) Sustain processes for self-assessment in support of maintaining high standards of readiness within the NNDM component commands across the relevant functional areas. Enclosure (3) provides attributes of an effective self-assessment process.

(2) Use existing applicable reporting systems to keep DIRSSP apprised of the current state of readiness of assigned elements to execute the NNDM.

(3) Advise DIRSSP about issues regarding subordinate commands and external commands or agencies (both inside and outside the Navy) that affect NNDM readiness.


(4) Provide DIRSSP with component commanders' estimates of current NNDM readiness, highlighting significant concerns twice a year. To avoid duplication, this report may be combined with a periodic component update to the NNDMOC.

(5) Provide DIRSSP with component commanders' estimates of NNDM sustainability, highlighting significant issues bearing on the component's projected ability to support the NNDM twice a year, at intervals evenly spaced between delivery of the reports cited in subparagraph 4c(4). This will include known concerns that require future action by the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system as well as component NNDM metrics. To avoid duplication, this report may be supported by or combined with existing reports to the CNO.

(6) Include DIRSSP on reports that update or change a component command's NNDM readiness. When reporting correction of an existing issue, include a narrative report of corrective action.

5. Records Management. Records created as a result of this instruction, regardless of media and format, must be managed per Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Manual 5210.1 of January 2012.

6. Reports Control. Reporting requirements within this instruction are exempt from reports control per SECNAV Manual 5214.1 of December 2005, part IV, subparagraph 7h.


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NNDM COMPONENTS AND FUNCTIONAL AREAS

NNDM Components

| NNDM Functional Areas | COMUSFLTFORCOM | COMPACFLT | COMUSFLTCYBERCOM | DIRSSP | COMNAVSUPSYSCOM | COMNAVSEASYSYSCOM | Chief of Naval Personnel | BUMED | CNIC |
|--|----------------|-----------|------------------|--------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------|------|
| Intelligence Support | X | X | X | | | | | | |
| Nuclear Forces | X | X | | X | | X | X | | |
| Supporting Forces | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | X |
| Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications | X | X | X | X | | | X | | |
| Surety and Force Protection | X | X | X | X | | X | X | X | X |
| Operational Readiness Assessment, Inspection, and Training | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Leadership and Management | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |

COMUSFLTFORCOM: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command

COMPACFLT: Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet

COMUSFLTCYBERCOM: Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command

COMNAVSUPSYSCOM: Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command

COMNAVSEASYSYSCOM: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command

BUMED: Bureau of Medicine and Surgery

CNIC: Commander, Navy Installations Command

NNDM TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM). The NNDM delivers a unique and critical national security function: a continuous, certain, and demonstrable sea-based strategic capability to deter any current or future adversary from aggression against the United States or its mutual defense allies. This integrated SoS capability is a cornerstone of U.S. deterrence posture, and is also essential to the extended deterrence that the United States delivers to its allies.

2. NNDM Functional Areas. Specific areas that together describe and encompass the broad range of activities that work together as an SoS to support the Navy's overarching nuclear deterrence mission.

a. Intelligence Support. The systems, tasking, collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of information supporting NW mission planning and execution. Includes intelligence support to deployed units for tactical security.

b. Nuclear Forces. The weapons, missiles, platforms, and other capability elements used to perform NW operations, through all phases of conflict, to the standards established by national and departmental policy and to the requirements established by U.S. Strategic Command, as well as the human capital capable of operating and sustaining those systems. Includes sustainment of any specialized technology and manufacturing capability necessary for these forces.

c. Supporting Forces. Other capabilities that enable the Navy's NW platforms to execute NW operations; encompasses operational systems and platforms, logistics support (supply chain, maintenance, facilities), and the human capital capable of providing the needed support. Includes sustainment of any specialized technology and manufacturing capability necessary for these capabilities.

d. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications. Assets, networks, communications systems, processes, and other capability elements that enable or support operational planning, deliberations, decision-making, and dissemination of commands by the President and appropriate national command authorities for

nuclear execution across all phases of conflict, as well as the human capital capable of operating and sustaining those systems. Includes sustainment of any specialized technology and manufacturing capability necessary for these forces.

e. Surety and Force Protection. Policies, procedures, systems, and other capability elements that provide assurance that personnel and forces are able to execute the NNNDM safely, securely, and reliably with required use control and within established personnel radiation exposure limits. This includes the capabilities for nuclear security command and control as well as threat intelligence. It also includes the capabilities needed to protect and secure against accidents or intentional assault on: intelligence, nuclear, and supporting forces, along with nuclear command, control, and communications forces. This includes the human capital capable of operating and sustaining relevant systems, and sustainment of any specialized technology and manufacturing capability necessary for these capabilities.

f. Operational Readiness Assessment, Inspection, and Training. The education, training, and exercises that support preparation for nuclear and supporting operations; and the tests, inspections, reviews, and other initiatives used to evaluate readiness. Also includes the human capital capable of operating and sustaining relevant systems.

g. Leadership and Management. Navy leadership knowledge of, engagement in, oversight of, and advocacy for the NNNDM, the Navy's top priority mission, as reflected in senior leader activities; the establishment and review of policy and doctrine for NNNDM performance; organizational structures; command and control; and personnel policies and practices. Includes management of relations with other countries, including extended deterrence commitments and encompasses an entity's process for self-assessment.

3. Self-Assessment. An entity's recurring review of its execution of its responsibilities in performance of the NNNDM, intended to promote quality control and proactive issue identification and resolution.

4. End-to-End Assessment. Review of the Navy's ability to execute the NNNDM that encompasses all doctrine, organization,

training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities elements and the vertical and horizontal integration of capabilities provided by NNDM components.

5. System of Systems (SoS). A set or arrangement that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities. The Navy uses an SoS approach to carrying out the NNDM; the success of the whole depends on the proper function of each element.

SELF-ASSESSMENT PROCESS

1. An organization's self-assessment process should be designed to evaluate the organization's ability to comply with applicable guidance and direction associated with its NNDM responsibilities, identify issues, and implement effective corrective actions. The attributes of a formal, healthy assessment program are outlined in subparagraphs 1a through 1i.

a. Clear identification and understanding throughout the organization of the core functions central to mission success, and identification of supporting areas that are key indicators of core function performance.

b. Guidance on acceptable methods to assess key indicators (administrative reviews, monitored evolutions, formal examination, etc.) and clearly defined metrics to measure performance.

c. Commitment to recurring reviews at varying levels commensurate with responsibilities. For example, a division officer or shop foreman may review their activities daily or weekly, a department head or general supervisor weekly or monthly, and higher lever supervisors as needed to validate program effectiveness and accountability of corrective actions.

d. Ability of an organization to identify and adjudicate day-to-day issues that arise outside of the formal assessment programs or external reviews, and then absorb these issues into the formal programs for accountability of corrective actions.

e. Healthy flow of leading, manageable indicators of deficient performance and good ideas that, when acted on, improve performance and prevent more significant deficiencies, as indicated by a rough comparison of the number of minor deficiencies to the number of more significant deficiencies identified. The number of minor deficiencies may be significantly higher. It may be acceptable to have no self-identified significant deficiencies, but lack of self-identified minor deficiencies may be cause for concern and evaluation of the process itself.

f. Grouping of related minor deficiencies to develop a theme, followed by an evaluation of the associated root cause

for the group. Correction of the root cause should also result in correction of the much more numerous minor deficiencies (i.e., the assessment must avoid simply attempting to remediate each symptom).

g. Bounding a significant deficiency or group of minor deficiencies. Bounding deficiencies is frequently addressed during the critique process; it demonstrates that an organization aggressively determined the extent of a particular issue. For example, if a procedural compliance issue is discovered during an evolution, the organization should determine whether it is an isolated case or pervasive problem throughout the unit.

h. Assignment of responsibility and accountability for correcting deficiencies, objective quality evidence that the corrective action has been completed, and the verification at some time later that the corrective action has been effective and enduring.

i. Integration of deficiencies identified across multiple assessments to ascertain if any adverse trends exist or if there is recurrence in particular types of deficiencies which could indicate that corrective action has not been sufficient or effective. Insufficient communication across the organization may be indicated if such trends or recurrence exist.